Guide on Following the Money in Trafficking in Persons Cases
A practical guide for investigating financial crime related to trafficking in persons cases
A significant challenge in harnessing financial investigations for effective counter-trafficking efforts remains a lack of comprehensive data and risk understanding across countries. For example, a 2018 FATF report on TIP-related financial flows examined 28 National Risk Assessments (NRA) from a range of jurisdictions. Only 14 of those identified TIP as a ML risk and only four classified such risks as high.
Money laundering threats in trafficking in persons
Rapid evolutions in technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), digital identities and virtual assets (VAs), have led to drastic changes in the transnational crime landscape. Select a threat to explore more.
Virtual assets 
Virtual Assets (VAs), encompassing non-fiat digital representations of value, such as cryptocurrencies, have become integral to the global financial landscape. While they offer innovative solutions to issues such as financial inclusion, their characteristics, such as anonymity, decentralisation, and rapid transaction capabilities, make them susceptible to misuse by criminal entities, including those involved in TIP.
The swift advancement of VAs and their supporting technologies often outpaces the development of regulatory frameworks, creating vulnerabilities and gaps that traffickers can exploit.
FATF found in April 2025 that 70 per cent of jurisdictions which had been assessed for compliance with the FATF Standards for VAs and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASP) were found to be partially compliant or non-compliant.
Cyber scam operations 
Cyber-scam operations in Southeast Asia are highly sophisticated, industrial scale, and specialise in social engineering techniques. Cyber-scams are often carried out by people who are forced to participate and are exploited for the purpose of forced criminality.
These operations exemplify a convergence of various forms of transnational organised crime, including trafficking in persons, cyber-enabled crime, corruption, money laundering and fraud.
Tens of billions of dollars (USD) are generated as illicit proceeds from cyber-scam operations annually.
Money or value transfer services 
Money or value transfer services (MVTS) are a range of remittance and money exchange providers. This can include large-scale providers (e.g. Western Union), or smaller unlicensed or unregulated platforms.
Some forms of MVTS have ties to particular geographic regions and are described using a variety of specific terms, such as ‘hawala’ or ‘hundi’. In these systems, money does not physically move across borders; instead, trusted intermediaries, known as hawaladars, facilitate transfers based on a code system shared between senders and recipients, leaving minimal financial records.
Casinos 
FATF has long recognised casinos as vulnerable to money laundering, due to their high cash intensity and competitive nature. A lack of effective anti-money laundering controls in online casinos and gaming platforms also creates significant vulnerabilities to a range of forms of financial crime. Online gambling operations have notably been directly tied to cyber-scam centre operations in Southeast Asia in recent years, facilitating not just financial crimes but also connected crimes such as fraud and corruption.
Special economic zones 
Special economic zones are designated areas within a country that operate under different economic regulations from the rest of the country, often offering tax benefits, relaxed trade rules, and reduced financial oversight to attract investment. However, these incentives can also create vulnerabilities that facilitate financial crime if enacted without the proportionate risk mitigation measures, such as increased opportunities for trade-based money laundering (TBML).
Professions 
Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) can be used (knowingly or unknowingly) to facilitate money laundering, e.g. in creating complex legal persons and arrangements to conceal the beneficial owner or the origin of funds.
- Real estate agents
- Lawyers
- Accountants
- Trust and company service providers
- Notaries
- Casinos
Building an effective, holistic approach
Effective trafficking in persons responses require collaboration among government, civil society and the private sector. There are several foundational building blocks to support effective follow-the-money approaches for TIP, at all stages (prevention, identification, investigation, asset tracing/confiscation and prosecution).
Select an option below to explore the key building blocks of effective approaches:
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Legal and regulatory frameworks, including sufficient AML, international cooperation and asset confiscation regimes.
Some BPMS report lengthy delays and hefty administrative burdens in pursuing conviction-based confiscation (CBC) actions. As an acceptable alternative that complements traditional CBC regimes, non-conviction-based confiscation (NCBC) frameworks enable law enforcement to seek confiscation in the absence of a criminal conviction, but where the link to criminality can be demonstrated to the civil standard of proof.
Competent authorities
Establishing competent authorities with sufficient domestic coordination mechanisms.
Investigating TIP through financial investigations requires a whole-of-government response.
Conducting financial investigations
Financial investigations are often conducted after the conclusion of the primary TIP investigation. This enables the defendants to hide or divert the proceeds of their crime.
Stakeholder engagement
Stakeholder engagement with public sector, private sector and civil society.
The guide aims to identify opportunities for increased collaboration between the counter-trafficking and financial crime communities, across both the private and public sector, e.g. policymakers, FIUs and law enforcement agencies (LEAs).
Formal and informal international cooperation
International cooperation can take many forms, including Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and extradition as examples of ‘formal’ international cooperation. Outside of these ‘formal’ mechanisms, many agencies (especially law enforcement) can leverage ‘informal’ mechanisms, such as joint taskforces with foreign counterparts, information exchanges or even basic correspondence.







